Buffalo Intellectual Property Law Journal
Volume 5

Number 1

Article 2

10-1-2007

Patenting the Tax Code: Monopolizing Basic Tax Strategy
Nicholas Robinson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffaloipjournal
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Taxation-Federal
Estate and Gift Commons

Recommended Citation
Nicholas Robinson, Patenting the Tax Code: Monopolizing Basic Tax Strategy, 5 Buff. Intell. Prop. L.J. 50
(2007).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffaloipjournal/vol5/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Intellectual Property Law Journal by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

BUFFALO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 5

FALL 2007

NUMBER 1

ARTICLE
PATENTING THE TAX CODE:
MONOPOLIZING BASIC TAX STRATEGY
NICHOLAS ROBINSON'

I. Introduction .......................................................................................
. . 51
II. Tax Planning and Patents ...................................................................
52
III. Wealth Transfer Group and Patent No. 6,567,790 ............................
57
IV . A ddressing the Issue .......................................................................
60
V . C onclusion .........................................................................................
65

In this paper I will discuss the new trend of patenting tax strategies
and the ramifications therefrom. The paper will consist of five parts: an
introduction where I generally go over the nature of the tax system in the
United States; a discussion of business method patents and the
consequences of patenting tax strategies; a case study of the first tax patent
to be contested; an overview of the possible reconciliatory actions that the
government is considering in addressing and possibly correcting the issue;
and, finally, a conclusion where I argue that tax strategies probably are not
patentable in the first place and even if they do slip through the system they
should not be patented as a matter of public policy.

Nicholas Robinson is the former Executive Editor of the Buffalo Intellectual Property Law
Journal and received his L.L.M. in Taxation from the University of Miami School of Law.
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I.
INTRODUCTION

Taxes are a necessary requirement for governments to raise revenue in
order to serve their people. In the United States, for the government to be
able to provide for the "Safety and Happiness" of the people as Thomas
Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of Independence, a very large amount of
money is needed in order to serve Americans. 2 The most recent data
available shows that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) collected about 1.1
trillion dollars from individual income taxes and a total nearing $2.3 trillion
from all sources in 2005. 3 The difference is covered by corporate, estate,
gift and other miscellaneous excise taxes.
When the government wants to raise a greater amount of funds than it
normally expects to receive in a given year it must raise taxes, or create a
new tax to create the desired revenue. New taxes are also often created to
replace the lost revenues of repealed taxes or lowered taxes. Taxes are
generally, and understandably, unpopular to most people. The trick that
legislators play is by levying taxes on those that seem most able to pay
them or in a manner that equates to a cost of doing or using the thing being
taxed. Conversely, the game that the tax practitioners have traditionally
played is that of planning around the tax law to minimize the liability for
their clients.
The individual and corporate income tax scheme operates on what is
known as a progressive rate system. As a person's income becomes
greater, so does the percentage rate at which she must pay tax. These rates
have varied greatly over time. In 1980 the top personal rate was 70%.
This was in stark contrast to the original income tax, provided by the
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, that started at 1% for the
first $20,000 and work up to a maximum rate of 7%. The progressive
system works under the impression that those most able to pay taxes, the
rich, are obligated to pay at a higher rate than those with less income.
Opponents of the current system say that a flat tax would be a more
equitable method of taxation. 6 The flat tax would eliminate a progressive
rate structure and have only one level of taxation. Typically this flat
structure is also compounded with a much simplified tax code that

para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
3 IRS Data Book, FY 2005, Publication 55b. Also, Chief Financial Officer, Revenue
Financial
Management
OS:CFO:R.
Available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/05db07co.xIs.
2 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

4 ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAx 2 (2007).

5 Id. at 30-31.
6 See Id.
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eliminates many deductions in favor of fairness and manageability.
However, with the tax code as complicated and convoluted as it
currently is, virtually all wealthy individuals and corporations rely on a tax
professional to help them wade through the mire that is tax law.
Practitioners have the role of using the law to their clients' advantage so
that they are subjected to the lowest possible amount of tax that is allowed
under the law. While the government wants to bring in revenue, it also is
not looking to have individuals of corporations pay more than they owe.
The prudent practitioner is able to plan for the future and minimize tax
liabilities.
II.
TAx PLANNING AND PATENTS
An interesting new development, however, is that tax planers have
started a movement towards patenting their tax advice. By doing so they
can effectively sell plans of advice like it were a normal commodity or
good. This differs greatly from the traditional roll that law and accounting
firms have played of selling advice as a service. This recent trend raises a
lot of questions on not only the legality of the practice, but also questions of
professional responsibility and professional manageability abound.
The first question presented by the patenting of tax advice would
undoubtedly be; 'Why?' Allen Kenney of Tax Analysts posses a short
hypothetical of a situation that would bring forth the inspiration to patent
tax advice in his article on the patent process. 7 The situation plays out that
an associate at a firm has an epiphany about a new tax planning structure
that could save his clients a large amount of money if implemented. 8 When
he takes the plan to his supervising partner they think that if they were able
to prevent other law firms from utilizing the same plan then they could
corner the market and make a lot of money. 9 The story may be a
hypothetical situation but it is probably a very accurate assessment on how
the idea to patent advice first arose. Though the end result achieves the
goals that patents exist for, the process of reaching the end goal is flawed.
The prolifically published U.S. Court of Appeals Judge for the
Seventh Circuit, Richard A. Posner, writes that "[t]he standard rationale of
patent law is that it is an efficient method of enabling the benefits of
research and development to be internalized, thus promoting innovation and
technological progress." 10 Patents are an economic reward for spending
resources to develop new technologies and ideas. Is legal advice really
7 Allen Kenney, The Birth of a Patent, 2007 TNT 78-5, Apr. 23, 2007.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294 (2003).

Fall 2007

something that would constitute an innovation or idea that demanded the
protection of patent law, however?
One possible argument that patenting advice, known as a business
method patent, should be allowed is that if it does not get patent protection,
the efforts that produced the method will be moved to a more technological
arena that would warrant patent protection." Though this argument may be
properly founded on economic realities in the business world, it seems far
less likely in the smaller, more specific legal world. Lawyers are not likely
to stop being lawyers simply because their advice is not protected under
patent law. It may be simply because the legal culture never thought of this
as a right, or even a possibility, until very recently.
The Federal Circuit court affirmed the legality of a business method
patent in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The structure that was set up in the case
was that of mutual funds pooling their assets in the form of a partnership in
order to take advantage of economies of scale and the favorable tax
attributes of being organized as a partnership. 12 Posner describes the tax
planning strategy as an algorithm which permits its patentability. 13 The
counter argument to the creation of this algorithm is that it is not deserving
of legal protection because the costs of creating something that is no more
than an idea is negligible. 14
To receive a patent in the first place the invention must be useful,
novel, non-obvious and fit into one of statutory classes of subject matter.15
The idea that organizing two companies together as a partnership would
result in some favorable tax treatment is not much of a novel idea and is
rather obvious to anyone familiar with the tax law. This type of plan, in 16a
generic, fit-any-situation layout, is not useful in the patent law sense.
Usefulness or utility is defined by Donald Chisum as the invention
"perform[ing] some function of positive benefit to society" and by Posner
as it having some economic viability; being something someone would be
willing to buy. 17 Suggesting, in general, that two companies could pool
their resources and achieve some tax benefits by organizing the pool as a
partnership is not of much use to anyone and would not demand any sort of

II Id. at 23 n.19.
12 Id. at 328 n.81.
13 Id.
14

Id. at 329.

15 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §1.01 (2007). See also 35 U.S.C. §101,
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefore..." Id.
16 Chisum, supra note 14 at § 1.03[5].
17 Id. at §4.01; LANDES&POSNER, supra note9, at 302.
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fee to acquire such knowledge. If the specific situation in which it is used
is what makes it novel and useful, then what is the need for patentability in
the first place? If the plan's use in a specific circumstance is what makes it
novel and useful, and subsequently patentable, then there is no need to
patent it because the exact situation could not be duplicated anyhow. Any
subsequent use of the plan could easily differ enough to avoid having to pay
a royalty to the patent holder.
These arguments appear to be purely academic as the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has been issuing more and more
business method patents since the ruling in Street Bank. Prior to the ruling,
only two patents had been issued for tax strategies.' 8 Since the 1998 ruling,
51 strategies have been granted patents as business methods with at least 85
applications still pending. 19 A problem may lie in the confusion of
different parts of the government encroaching upon the territory of each
other. The director of the business methods technology center at USPTO,
Wynn Coggins, said that "[r]ight now it's difficult to find folks that have an
engineering background that qualifies them to be hired, but also have the
finance or insurance or some type of other background to help us in those
areas." 20 The USPTO is essentially making tax policy without having any
tax knowledge. Though not illegal, the Treasury Department has expressed
concern over the unequal treatment of different taxpayers in similar
situations. 2 1 It seems intuitively wrong that one individual will not be
allowed to follow the law in the same way as another because the later
patented her interpretation of the tax code before anyone else did.
Lawyers by themselves are not businesses designed to produce goods.
By patenting a strategy they are hoping to capitalize on the licensing fees
that would correlate with other lawyers or practitioners utilizing the same
method. This concept was addressed in the 2006 Supreme Court case of
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837. MercExchange held a
business method patent for conducting online auctions and was trying to
lease the rights to its use to both eBay and Half com in a similar manner
that it had with other online auction retailers. 22 In District Court,
MercExchange won over the jury as they decided that eBay did in fact
infringe on their patent and ordered damages but denied the injunctive relief
motion. 23 Once the issue got to the Supreme Court they based their
decision on denying injunctive relief based on a four factor test that has
18 Dustin Stamper, Tax Strategy Patents:A Problem Without A Solution?, 2007 TNT 78-

3, Apr. 23, 2007.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006) [hereinafter eBay].
23 Id.
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been established through prior patent cases. 24 The test the court used in
eBay to determine if injunctive relief was warranted was as follows:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate
for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the
25
public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
This test is interesting when applied to tax patents and taken in
conjunction with Justice Kennedy's second concurring opinion in the case.
Kennedy writes that there is an emerging market of patent holders
who acquire the patent for no other reason that collecting licensing fees as
they themselves have no desire to capitalize on the patented invention
directly. 26 When the threat of suing for infringement is simply a leverage
tool to get others to pay a licensing fee then the economic structure of
patents has fundamentally changed and the rules for relief for infringement
should change in accordance. 27 Damages to a holding party could really be
no more than court costs and enjoining the use of the patent serves no one's
28
interests.
This is a salient point when taken in the context of tax patents. It is
possible that a person or company that could not even legally use the tax
strategy could acquire a patent on it. Then, the only way in which the
owner would derive and income from the patent would be to license the
strategy or receive damages from winning infringement cases. From a
purely economic stand point there is not a whole lot that is wrong with that
scenario. Paying a licensing fee is simply a cost of doing business that
would ultimately be passed on to the client. However, from a public policy
stand point is that a practice that should be encouraged and allowed to
continue? 29 A conventional argument would be that allowing the patents, it
encourages more creative thought in developing new and original tax
strategies that might be worth paying a licensing fee for in order to
implement. However, as I discuss immediately below and in the Wealth
Transfer case in Part III, the whole idea of a novel tax strategy is highly
24 Id. See also Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-313 (1982); Amoco
Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987) for more about the four factor test for
injunctive relief.

25 eBay, supra note 21, at 1839.
26 Id. at 1842.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 "That rule [of not patenting certain inventions like ideas] reflects 'both ... the
enormous potential for rent seeking that would be created if property rights could be
obtained in [those types of inventions] and ... the enormous transaction costs that would be
imposed on would-be users."' CHISUM, supra note 14, at §1.03 n. 73 (quoting LANDES &
POSNER, supra note 9, at 305-6).
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dubious.
Just trying to figure out if the tax strategy is novel or has been a
practice that has been used before is just one of the problems for the
USPTO. 30 Part of the problem is that much if not most tax advice is
already protected to some degree and is not readily open to the public. The
attorney/client privilege protects the advice from being disseminated to the
public unless the client chooses to break it. Even in publicly traded
companies that have to disclose financial statements to their investors, all of
the information regarding specific transactions might not be known. Each
step of the transaction may be thoroughly disclosed but it may be far from
obvious how the whole transaction was structured and how each step was
31
interwoven amongst the larger background.
Realizing that the USPTO is inadequately trained to fully understand
complex, tax-based financial transaction and unable to divest resources into
forensic accounting to research past transactions, the Tax Section of the
American Bar Association (ABA) has begun training programs geared
towards patent examiners at the USPTO. 3 2 The first of such training
sessions took place last January and worked to help examiners search for
prior uses of estate planning techniques. 33 At the 2007 May meeting of the
Tax Section of the ABA there is a program oriented the opposite way,
towards the tax practitioner. The program is designed to educate tax and
estate attorneys on how to research patents to ensure that their advice is not
already patented by someone else. On the panel are two examiners from the
USPTO. 34 Another option has been suggested that the USPTO be required
to inform the IRS of any patent issued that may be a tax strategy or may be
used as a tax strategy. 35 The IRS could then compile a database of patented
tax strategies making research for practitioners and auditors far simpler and
require less formal training on the intricacies of patent law and patent
research.
However, there is a benefit to ignorance when it comes to patent
infringement. 36 By not searching for patents when suggesting a strategy a

30

35 U.S.C. § 102(a) denies the issuance of a patent if the "invention was known or used

by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent..."
31 David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelter, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 242.
32 Id.
33 Id.

34 American
Bar
Association
Section
of
Taxation
May
Meeting,
http://meetings.abanet.org/meeting/tax/MAY07/
media/Teaching%20Tax%2OMini%20Program.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2007).
35 Making Taxpayers Report Patented Tax Advice Is Bad Idea, Aicpa Rep Tells IRS,
2007 TNT 55-3, Mar. 21, 2007.
36 Dustin Stamper, USPTO Official Critical Of Bill To Prevent Patents On Tax
Strategies, 2007 TNT 94-1, May 15, 2007.
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tax practitioner could be protected from the triple damages awarded for
willful infringement. 37 Patent attorney with Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney
PC, Charles F. Wieland III, says that the "[c]urrent law does discourage
patent searching." 3 8 This is all well and good if the practitioner were going
to take the risk of recommending a strategy that is already patented even
after knowing so. It may seem like a situation where the patent holder
would have no way of even finding out that the patented strategy was ever
implemented. As discussed in the next section, however, one such patent
holder has sued to protect his patent.
III.
WEALTH TRANSFER GROUP AND PATENT

No. 6,567,790

Any relief that practitioners hoped to find in the courts over possibly
infringing use of tax strategy patents was very recently squashed. 39 Wealth
Transfer Group sued former Aetna President and CEO, John W. Rowe on
January 6, 2006 in U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut for
infringement of their patent issued in May of 2003.40 Rowe was trying to
transfer money from himself to his family and minimize the gift tax that
would have to be paid to the IRS. 4 1 In January of 2006 the firm sued Rowe,
42
claiming that they owned a patent that covered the strategy used by Rowe.
Rowe placed about 28.5 million dollars worth of nonqualified stock options
in two grantor retained annuity trusts (GRATs) that would pay him an
annual income for a period of time and everything left would go to his
family.4 3 The issue that is scary to tax practitioners and their clients is that
this plan was incredibly popular and a staple in estate planning.
Thomas P. Ochsenschlager, vice president of taxation for the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, said that he would "bet
you dollars to doughnuts it was done 100 times." 44 The technology boom
in the mid to late 90s created a very large amount of wealth in this country
45
that was tied up in stock options from the stock rich internet companies.
37 Id.
38 Id.

39 Stamper, supra note 17.
40 Id.; Wealth Transfer Group L.L.C. v. John W. Rowe, Docket No. 3:06-cv-00024AWT (D. Conn.) availableat 2006 TNT 138-11; U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (filed Dec. 1,

1999).
41 Steve Seidenberg, Taxation Innovation; Patent Office receives criticismfor issuing
patents on tax strategies,INSIDE CouNs., Dec., 2006, at 22.
42 Id. See also Wealth Transfer Group's website advertising their patent for funding
GRATs with nonqualified stock options at http://www.wealth-transfer.com/options.html (last
visited Apr. 27, 2007).
43 Seidenberg, supra note 40.
44 Stamper, supra note 17.
45

Id.
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David Handler of the Chicago office of Kirkland & Ellis says that "[f]or
anyone with an estate tax issue and more than one hundred thousand dollars
in assets, [setting up a GRAT] is as run of the mill as they come." 46 It is
clear that Wealth Transfer Group was not the first to use a GRAT and did
not invent its use. Wealth Transfer Group first filed for their patent on
December 1, 1999.47 GRATs were well known far before Wealth Transfer
Group filed for the patent. This being the case, it would warrant the nonissuance of the patent because of the first exception to the general rule of
48
patentability.
Congress purposefully amended the tax law to allow for the use of
GRATs with the passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990.49 The applicable section of the Internal Revenue Code (the 'code') is
2702. Though the code and its corresponding treasury regulations did not
explicitly provide for GRAT, the IRS issued guidance to taxpayers in 1992
regarding the qualification of GRATs under Section 2072.5o The Private
Letter ruling says that GRATs "are considered to be a reasonable
interpretation of the statute" and are covered by 2702.51
Section 2702 establishes the rules for valuing the retained interest in
the trust for gift tax purposes if the interest is transferred. This is an
important step in establishing that the planning method of using the GRAT
will stand up to the scrutiny of the IRS and allows for the ultimate reduction
in gift taxes in the end. Rowe's plan was to receive payments from his
52
GRAT for a fixed period and then for his retained interest to terminate.
By establishing that the retained interest has a set value, it can then be taxed
if the interest is transferred. The trick is that the interest is never meant to
transfer. When Rowe's interest term ends, he no longer has a retained
interest in the trust. His tax attachment to the trust is effectively terminated.
As long as Rowe is alive at the time the term of the trust end he does not
have any "right to the income" of the trust which would force inclusion to
his estate for estate tax purposes. 5 3 Establishing that the right, while
possessed, does have value means that the initial transfer of the assets to the
trust is subject only to the difference between the retained interest and the
total interest. A properly constructed GRAT can make the retained interest
almost equal to the total interest, thus avoiding gift tax on the initial
46 Seidenberg, supra note 40.
47

U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (filed Dec. 1, 1999).

48 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). See also CHISUM, supra note 14, at § 1.03.
49 Pub. L. 101-508, §11602, 1991-1 C.B. 481, 524 (codified in the various sections of
Chapter 14 of 26 U.S.C.); Seidenberg, supra note 40.
50 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9245005 (July 31, 1992).
51 Id.
52 Seidenberg, supra note 40.

53 26 U.S.C. §2036(a)(1).
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transfer.
Rowe needed the flexibility of the GRAT setup because of the nature
of his assets that he contributed and the fact that he still wanted to get
money from the assets. Stock options usually have a time limit for them to
be exercised. He had to act immediately if he wanted to use them.
Additionally, it was not necessary for him to transfer the options in a trust
for the benefit of his children because he was still alive and able to take care
of their needs. Finally, he still wanted to enjoy some of the income from
the options. The GRAT was a perfect solution and perfectly legal from the
standpoint of the IRS. Rowe could put the options in a trust, get paid an
amount of interest from the trust for a number of years, end his interest and
the trust's corpus could then pass to his children free from gift or estate tax.
The key is the initial value of the retained interest being high in comparison
to the total interest and the assets earning more than the Section 7520
interest rate assumptions. With his children named as the remainder
beneficiaries, they would receive the growth of the assets free from gift tax
to their father. Stock options for internet stock had a very high growth rate
so a lot of money could be transferred to the children free from gift tax.
It is unfortunate for the legal community that the Wealth Transfer's
case was never litigated to a conclusion, however. 54 District Court Judge
Alvin W. Thompson approved a confidential settlement offer between the
parties on April 12, 2007. 55 The allowance of the settlement may be seen
as tacit approval of the validity of the patent as nearly 16 months worth of
litigation should have been enough time to convince the judge to through
out the case if he believed the patent to be erroneously awarded.
Another very odd aspect of the suit is that only Rowe was sued for
infringement, the attorneys who advised him to use the stock-optionfunded-GRAT were not named as defendants. 56 It seems that only one of
the two groups, Rowe or the advisors, could be sued because one of them
was actually the infringer. The other was a contributory infringer allowing
for the infringer to infringe and is not subject to liability without knowledge
of the infringement. 57 It is reasonable to assume that Rowe will take his
losses out on his attorneys in a malpractice suit but is Rowe really the one
that should have been sued here? There is a question of who is the one
actually using the advice for purposes of infringement and possible
licensing. Is it the client or is it the advisors? This is an extremely
complicated question and a court decision involving its answer would have
been very helpful to practitioners.
54 Stamper, supra note 17.
55 Id.
56 Steve Seidenberg, CrisisPending, ABA J., May, 2007.
57 Chisum, supra note 14, at §17.03[2].
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IV.
ADDRESSING THE ISSUE

The structure of a GRAT is obviously very complex as is the
reasoning behind it working the way it does. 5 8 There is a degree of
familiarity required with the subject matter before it can be easily
understood. The problem currently is that the patent office has not had any
familiarity with trusts or the inner workings of the tax code.
"It's always the same story whenever there are new types of patents,"
says Stephen Schreiner, a patent attorney in the Washington, D.C., office of
Hunton & Williams. "Eventually, the patent office develops a body of prior
art, hires people to deal with this area and the system works well.... This
has been the pattern with such things as biotech patents, software patents
59
and business-method patents."
The USPTO seemed somewhat ignorant to the possibilities of what
patenting tax advice might bring too. The Commissioner of Patents was
asked to testify before the U.S. Senate Finance Committee regarding tax
advice patents in 2004 and stated that "there shall be no disparate treatment
for different categories of inventions." 60 This statement is shows complete
naivet6 to his field of work. Design patents are only given 14 years of
protection while plant patents are given 20.61 Clearly, not all patents, let
alone, technologies are created equal, despite the assertions of the
Commissioner.
Nick Godici also seems to disagree with Schreiner about the system
working well with the progression of time. He brags that "[t]o assist our
examiners in finding pertinent prior art, we ... have established 'Electronic
Information Centers' which provide examiners with access to over 1000
non-patent literature data-bases, over one-third of which contain business
and financial information." 62 Having a Web-MD account does not make
someone a doctor; nor does a LexisNexis account make him a lawyer. As
evidence of the accuracy and properness of the business method patents that
have been issued, Godici cites that the rate of business method patents
58 See appendix for reproduction of the chart that diagramed a stock option GRAT from
Wealth Transfer Group's patent application.
59 Seidenberg, supra note 40.
60 Bridging the Tax Gap: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 108th Cong., 194, 197
(2004) [hereinafter Godici tesitmony] (statement of Nick Godici, Comm'r of Patents for U.S.
Department of Commerce), availableat http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/95484.pdf.
61 General
Information
Concerning
Patents,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/index.html#design (last visited Apr. 26,
2007); See also Chisum, supra note 14, at §16.04 (discusses the duration for different
patents).
62 Godici testimony, supra note 59, at 198.
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issued has been decreasing and the applicants have been complaining that
the office's criteria have been too strict. 6 3 This is rather specious reasoning
as it was shown above that the absolute number of patents is increasing and
if Godici is testifying before congress then there must be a number of
64
people who think they are being too liberal with their issuances.
Godici's testimony before the Senate Finance Committee appeared to
65
be more of a defense of the value of his work and a plea for more money.
He failed to address specific issues with tax patents and focused completely
on the broader category of business method patents. It is not completely
fair to say that a tax strategy is identical to a conventional business method
in every respect that they need not be addressed separately. Tax strategies
are unique because patenting them could "have a negative impact on [the
66
taxpayers'] ability to comply with the tax law."
Advocates argue that patents have protected other inventions that have
to comply with laws and that tax advice is no different. "In theory, [a taxstrategy patent] isn't different from getting a patent on something that some
other federal agency, such as the FDA, might have a say over," says Arti
Rai, a patent law professor at Duke University School of Law. 67 Simply
because there is a government agency that sets legal standards that must be
followed does not mean that IRS is only a regulatory agency. A patent for a
drug that passes the FDA's safety standards is not the same as a patented
tax strategy. The patent on the drug does not patent the use of the law that
sets the safety standards. It does not require the payment of a royalty by the
next drug manufacturer because their drug passed the same test and failed to
kill someone. Another posed example is a patent on an engine that must
pass emissions laws. 68 This analogy would only work if the law required
that something like a catalytic converter be used on all cars. Then someone
went out and patented the very use of a catalytic converter. Patenting a tax
strategy is not like the patenting of something that complies with a
regulation like an emission approved engine or a safe drug. It is akin to
patenting the regulation itself. The only way to comply with the law is to
pay some else a royalty.
Despite the seeming insistence by the patent community that the
patenting of tax advice is not a problem and perfectly legal under the patent
law, there are others who are looking to change the law in order to protect

63 Id.
64 Stamper, supra note 17.

65 Godici testimony, supra note 59, at 201.
66 Seidenberg, supra note 40 (quoting Mark Everson, commissioner of the IRS, in his
July testimony to the House Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures).
67 Id. (Prof. Rai's profile is available at http://www.law.duke.edu/fac/rai/).
68 Id.
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the workability of the tax code. 69 Senator Carl Levin of Michigan has
introduced the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act (S.681) with Senators Norm
Coleman and Barack Obama co-sponsoring. 70 The act is a broad attempt to
curb abusive tax shelters offering amendments to numerous sections of the
code. Section 303 of the act also amends the patent laws under title 35 of
the United States Code. 7 1 Section 102 of title 35 limits the availability of
patents. 72 The amended act would include an exception for issuing a patent
if "the invention is designed to minimize, avoid, defer,
or otherwise affect
73
the liability for Federal, State, local, or foreign tax."
Even with such language in a bill that appears to be clear and precise,
there is still the matter of the patent examiners being able to identify the
application as a tax strategy whose goal is reduce tax liability. The heart of
a patent application is the claim. Writing the claim has become more and
more a work of art where the writer is trying to be as broad as possible in
the claim as to afford her client the most protection. 74

Samuel Morse's

patent application asked for "the use of the motive power of

.

. electro-

magnetism, however developed[,] for making or printing intelligible
characters at any distance." 75 Very few people could have understood the
principles of electro-magnetism in 1838 when Morse filed for his patent and
the vagueness of his application could have granted him a monopoly on
virtually all electronic communication had it been granted.76 This is an
important and illustrative example because only with the hindsight of about
170 years of technological innovation is it obvious that Morse's application
was overly vague.
Without a high working knowledge of tax strategies, the patent office
examiners cannot accurately make the same conclusions about tax
patents. 77 In the tradition of vagueness in the claim many applicants "don't
actually call their patent application a tax strategy in the title or really
anywhere in it. So it can be kind of challenging for the examiners to find

69 Patenting Tax Advice Before the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, 10 9th Cong. (2006)
(statement of Dennis 1. Belcher, Partner, McGuireWoods LLP, Richmond, Virginia).
70 S. 681, 110th Cong., §303 (2007), [hereinafter Abuse Act] available at 2007 TNT 3528. See also Elizabeth A. Starrs et al., Colorado Bar Opposes Patenting Of Tax Advice,
2007 TNT 50-35, Mar. 5, 2007 (The Colorado Bar issued a letter to Sens. Levin, Coleman
and Obama agreeing with the language of S. 681 to limit the patentability of tax strategies).

71 Abuse Act, supra note 69.
72 35 U.S.C. §102, Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent.
73 Abuse Act, supra note 69.
74 Stamper, supra note 17.
75 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 9, at 323 (quoting O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 67
(1853 U.S. LEXIS 273, 33) (1853)); See also CHISUM, supra note 14, at §1.03[1].
76 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 9, at 323.
77 Stamper, supra note 17.
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that and put it in the right category." 7 8 If Senator Levin's bill passes and
becomes the law, it is safe to assume that new patent claims would try their
best to obfuscate the fact that the effect of the strategy is to avoid or
minimize federal, state or international taxes. Examiners would need the
ability to break down the proposed transaction and analyze the tax
consequences to determine that it is "designed to" reduce taxes. 79 This
unfortunately brings in the question of intent of the proposed transaction
strategy. This is an area that some in the tax community has been working
to clarify recently.
Intent is very difficult to prove in a court room and even more so on a
tax return. 80 The courts and practitioners have created this idea known as
the economic substance doctrine to aide in discerning the intention to avoid
tax and some other intention that also has as a result the avoidance or
reduction in tax. 8 1 Two recent cases that relied heavily on the concept of
economic substance in the opinions are The Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States, 435 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2006) and Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United
States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In both of the cases the courts said
that the transactions failed to show any motive other than tax avoidance
because they did not have economic substance.
The problem with the idea of economic substance is that there is no
explicit definition for it. It is something that has been put together from
cases and loosely described as having some risk of losing money.8 2 The
Coltec and Dow Chemical cases asked the Supreme Court to take up the
83
economic substance doctrine and write the doctrine specifically into law.
Both of the cases were denied certiorari, however, on February 1 6th.84 The
Chief Counsel of the IRS, Donald Korb, believes that the refusal of the
Supreme Court to pick up these cases on the basis of economic substance
means that the court is satisfied with the current interpretation of the
doctrine that does not need further explanation. 85 He also hopes that
78 Id. (quoting Wynn Coggins, see supra text accompanying note 19).
79 Abuse Act, supra note 69.
80 Weisbach, supra note 30, at 242.
81 See generally Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (The Supreme Court ruled
that though the transaction complied with the tax code it was done only to avoid a dividend
tax and, subsequently, disregarded the form on the transaction); See also Frank Lyon Co. v.
United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978) (The Supreme Court permitted the transaction because "a
genuine multiple-party transaction with economic substance which [was] compelled or
encouraged by business . . . realities . . . and [was] not shaped solely by tax-avoidance
features .... Id. at 583-84.).
82 See generally Charles I. Kingson, The Confussion Over Tax Ownership, 93 TAX
NOTES 409 (Oct. 15, 2001).
83 Sheryl Stratton, IRS, Tax Bar Urge Congress To Leave Economic Substance Alone,

2007 TNT 36-2 (Feb. 21, 2007)
84 See Dow's petition, Doc 2006-21019; Coltec's petition, Doc 2006-23232.
85 Stratton, supra note 82.
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Congress does not feel like they need to get involved and write a definition
of the doctrine into the code as a definition can only damage the
interpretation that he sees as currently free of problems. 86 Passage of S.
681 may force the codification of an economic substance doctrine to ensure
the workability of the law from the standpoint of the USPTO. Asking
examiners to determine intent of the proposed transaction using "a flexible
judicial rule, what some are calling 'judicial overhang"' 87 is unreasonable
to assure that the congressional intent of S. 681 is upheld.
The Texas Bar association has passed a resolution in support of
amending 35 U.S.C. §287 to limit the enforceability of tax patents against
those who may use a patented strategy. 88 Under the law as it is currently
written:
[w]ith respect to a medical practitioner's performance of a medical
activity that constitutes an infringement under section 271(a) or (b) of this
title or (b)], the provisions of sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 of this
title[referring to the remedies available to the injured party] shall not apply
against the medical practitioner 89or against a related health care entity with
respect to such medical activity.
The Texas Bar wants to add an amendment that affords the same
protection to tax practitioners as it does to medical practitioners under
§287(c) of 35 U.S.C. 90 In a denial of certiorari to the Supreme Court,
86

Id.

Id.(quoting Donald Korb).
Texas State Bar Passes Resolution On Patents Of Tax Planning Methods, 2007 TNT
(Feb. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Texas Bar].
35 U.S.C. §287(c)(1) (2007), amended by 108 Stat. 4989 (1996).
90 Texas Bar, supra note 87. Their proposed amendment is to add subsection (d) and
would read as follows:
87
88
39-43
89

(d)
(1)With respect to a taxpayer's and/or tax practitioner's utilization of a tax planning method

that constitutes an infringement under section 271(a) or (b) of this title, the provisions of
sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 of this title shall not apply against the taxpayer, the tax
practitioner, or any related professional organization with respect to such tax planning

method.
subsection:
this
of
purposes
the
For
(2)
(A) the term "tax planning method" means a plan, strategy, technique or structure that is
designed to or has, when implemented, the effect of reducing, minimizing or deferring a
taxpayer's tax liability, but shall not include the use of tax preparation software or other
mechanical tools used solely to perform or model mathematical calculations or prepare tax
returns.
information
or
(B) the term "taxpayer" means an individual, entity or other person (as defined in Section
7701 of the Internal Revenue Code) that is subject to taxation directly, is required to prepare
a tax return or information statement to enable one or more other persons to determine their
law.
a
tax
by
impacted
otherwise
or
is
liability,
tax
(C) the terms "tax," "tax laws," "tax liability," and "taxation" mean, or refer to as the context
may require, any Federal, State (as defined in subsection (c)(2)(G) above), county, city,
municipality or other governmental levy, assessment or imposition, whether measured by
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Justice Breyer wrote in the dissent to the denial that patenting medical
procedures "may inhibit doctors from using their best medical judgment;
they may force doctors to spend unnecessary time and energy to enter into
license agreements; they may divert resources from the medical task of
health care to the legal task of searching patent files for similar simple
correlations." 9 1 This argument for tax practitioners simply trying to
interpret the law and apply it effectively for their clients appears to be
equally persuasive as the medical exception for the Texas Bar. They also
realize the unique nature and role of the tax law and the job of the tax
advisor. Taxes do not directly save lives as medical procedures but their
influence in every facet of life is indisputable.
V.
CONCLUSION

The area of patenting tax strategies is very unique and presents many
different questions that are not easily answered by analogizing conventional
situations. As Justice Kennedy points out in his concurring eBay decision,
there have been "rapid technological and legal developments in the patent
system" and that "it should be recognized that district courts must
determine whether past practice fits the circumstances of the cases
before them." 9 2 Kennedy recognizes something that Godici was trying to
down play is his Senate testimony. 9 3 Just because business method patents
have been allowed in the past does not mean that they are applicable to the
current environment.
If the patent office is unwilling to actively curb the issuance of tax
strategy patents then tax practitioners will have to seriously alter the way
that they have traditionally done business. Though one patent attorney is

income,
value
or
otherwise.
(D) the term "tax practitioner" means any natural person who provides advice and
consultation to a taxpayer with respect to a tax planning method or who is acting under the
direction of such person in connection with the development or utilization of a tax planning

method.
(E) the term "related professional organization" means an entity with which a tax practitioner
has a professional affiliation under which the tax practitioner may provide advice and
consultation with respect to a tax planning method, including but not limited to a law firm,

accounting
firm,
or
a
bank.
(F) the term "professional affiliation" shall mean an employment or contractual relationship
or
partnership
or
other
ownership
interest.
(3) This subsection shall not apply to any patent issued based on an application the earliest
effective filing date of which is prior to _,
2007.
91 Laboratory Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2928

(2006) (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted).
92 eBay, supra note 21, at 1842-3.
93 Godici testimony, supra note 59 at 198.
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arguing that ignorance is better than researching possible patents; 9 4 I find
this a very perilous path especially after Wealth Transfer Group's suit.
Instead, a heightened awareness of the structure of the transaction that they
may be recommending to their client is needed to assure that they are not
infringing upon a patent. Not only to protect themselves from suits, but to
protect their clients like John Rowe.
This added expense to assure compliance with the patent laws seems
excessive however. 95 At what point does the patenting of legal strategies
go too far? Can someone patent a criminal defense of insanity due to
depression? If that was the situation that the defendant was in, who is to
say he cannot use the defense? If Rowe had no other assets other that his
stock options to fund the GRAT, why should he not be able to use them
without paying for the right? Granted, a criminal defense case may be
somewhat more pertinent as it involves someone's life and not their money.
But is the legal basis behind the two situations all that much different?
From a public policy standpoint I do not believe that this is merely a cost of
doing business issue as it more greatly impinges upon an individual's
ability to comply with the law.
As Professor Tim Wu notes in his article "When Code Isn't Law," that
there is an economic interest for people and companies to want to avoid
paying taxes. 96 The issuance of patents in this area is affecting the amount
of taxes people legally are required to pay. While it is required by law that
a person pay their taxes, they are only required to pay what they owe. By
issuing patents on tax strategies, the USPTO is altering the amount a person
legally owes. Companies would be willing to pay for patented tax
strategies if, in the end, they came out economically ahead. 97 The issue is
that they should not be required to pay for the ability to assert their legal
rights in this case. Realizing the nature of tax strategies as being tools of
the tax code, the Texas Bar's proposal should be
compliance with
98
implemented.
If Congress and the USPTO fail to amend the current patent process
and continue to issue patents for tax strategies then, as proposed above, a
database of tax specific patents provided by the USPTO and run by the IRS
would be an extremely useful tool and indeed, even a necessary one, for tax
practitioners. Even if Senator Levin's proposed bill passes the database
would be important because the bill does not invalidate previously issued
patents. 99 A firm court decision is needed on a tax patent issue so that both
94 See Stamper, supra note 35 (citing Charles F. Wieland 111).
95 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 9, at 305-6.
96 See generally Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679 (June, 2003).
97 Id. at 698.
98 See Texas Bar, supra note 87.
99 Abuse Act, supra note 69, at §303(b).
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communities know where they stand legally. Congress will probably be
unwilling to make too bold of a move before an issue is fully litigated rather
than just settled as in Rowe's case. Undoubtedly, there is still much more
to come from this.
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100 U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 fig. 3 (filed Dec. 1, 1999).
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